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Privacy & Security

BrightBlur treats its own server as untrusted. All sensitive face operations happen on your device. The server stores a redacted base image alongside encrypted face data it cannot read. Faces you choose to keep visible, and any missed during review, remain clear in that base image.

  • Face detection — AI models run in your browser via WebAssembly. No image data is sent to the server for detection.
  • Face recognition — fingerprints (embeddings) are computed locally and encrypted before upload. Matching happens entirely on your device.
  • Encryption — clear face slices, biometric fingerprints, captions, and comments are encrypted before they leave your device. The redacted base is the ordinary image layer of the BBP file format.
  • Decryption — when you view a photo, your browser fetches encrypted blobs, decrypts them locally, and composites the faces in real time.

The server holds the plaintext-redacted base image plus encrypted face slices, biometric fingerprints, captions, comments, and keys. It can therefore see the redacted scene — bodies, clothing, setting, and how many faces were mosaicked — but it cannot decrypt protected face layers, captions, comments or biometric fingerprints. Faces kept visible or missed during review are not protected by face encryption. It can also read account and access metadata such as your email, group names, membership lists, timestamps, and sharing relationships. The Privacy Policy lists the full set of server-visible data.

Photos published or migrated to the BrightBlur Protocol (BBP) store their permanently mosaicked base as the ordinary image layer of the file. Access through BrightBlur remains protected by the serving ACL, but the redacted scene is no longer protected by content encryption. If someone exports or leaks the BBP file, any holder can see that redacted scene; the encrypted face entities remain unreadable without their keys.

This is a deliberate portability trade-off: a standard image viewer can show the redacted base, while a BrightBlur-aware viewer can restore only the faces its user is authorised to open. Older BrightBlur photos encrypted the whole redacted base as well as the faces.

BrightBlur uses two encryption schemes simultaneously:

  • X25519 — a classical, battle-tested elliptic curve scheme.
  • ML-KEM-768 — a post-quantum scheme standardised by NIST.

The shared secrets are combined to derive the encryption key. The design aims to preserve confidentiality if one key-exchange algorithm is broken, provided the other algorithm, the combiner and their implementations remain secure. This does not protect against malicious client code, compromised dependencies or a device exposing plaintext or keys.

Your private keys are derived on your device from a seed. New passkey accounts use a random seed, protected by your passkey’s PRF output before an encrypted copy is stored on the server. The server does not receive the secret needed to unwrap that copy.

New accounts have no recovery phrase. Older phrase-based accounts can still regenerate their seed with their saved phrase. Provisional accounts keep their seed on the device until Back up this device is completed. Use Backup devices while you can still unlock your keys; a password reset alone cannot restore them.

During an active session, your browser keeps the wrapped seed and the PRF key in IndexedDB; the unwrapped seed itself exists only in memory, never in storage. Both the wrapped seed and the PRF key are cleared from IndexedDB the moment you log out, and the server never sees your private keys at all.