Privacy Policy
Last updated: 13 November 2026
BrightBlur is a photo sharing app built for groups that include children. Nurseries, schools, sports clubs, families. It exists because sharing photos of children through WhatsApp groups or Facebook is a privacy problem that everyone acknowledges and nobody fixes.
This policy explains what data BrightBlur collects, what it does with that data, and what it cannot do. We have tried to write it in plain English. Where a legal term is unavoidable, we explain it.
The short version
Section titled “The short version”Face detection and review happen on your device. Protected face regions are pixelated in the shared base image; tagged faces also have encrypted clear layers controlled by face permissions. Faces you choose to keep visible, and any missed during review, remain visible to anyone who can view the photo. BrightBlur and its hosting provider can see the base image and sharing metadata, but cannot decrypt the protected face layers.
What happens when you create an account
Section titled “What happens when you create an account”You register with an email address and either a password or a passkey. Current setup generates a random master seed on your device and derives your cryptographic keys from it. The seed is encrypted using a secret produced through your passkey before a copy is stored on the server. Password registration also requires a passkey for this encryption setup.
New accounts are not given a recovery phrase. Older accounts created from a 12-word phrase can still use it to regenerate their keys; some also store an encrypted copy of that phrase for recovery-kit download. Provisional accounts keep their seed only on the device until the user backs it up. See Passkeys for the available backup paths.
What the server stores about your account:
- Your email address and, if set, a hashed password (scrypt — the plaintext password is never stored)
- Your BrightBlur identifier (a unique DID)
- Your public key
- Your wrapped master seed (which the server cannot unwrap without your passkey’s secret, and that secret never leaves your device)
- An encrypted recovery phrase, where configured for an older phrase-based account
- Passkey credentials, if registered
What the server does not store:
- Your plaintext password
- Your plaintext recovery phrase
- Your unencrypted private key
What happens when you upload a photo
Section titled “What happens when you upload a photo”- Your device runs face detection locally, in your browser. No image data is sent to the server for detection.
- You review each detected face. Faces are hidden by default: tag a face to a person so that person’s face permissions decide who sees it clearly, choose Permanently hide, or choose Keep visible so that anyone viewing the photo sees it.
- Tagged and hidden faces are permanently destroyed in the base image: each face region is overwritten on your device with a coarse grid of averaged colour blocks, and the original pixels are not included in those regions of the shared base. Tagged faces have separate encrypted clear layers; choosing Permanently hide stores no clear layer for that face. This does not alter the original photo on your device. Pixelation reduces visible facial detail; it does not guarantee anonymity or resistance to every recognition method. Clothing, setting and other context may still identify someone.
- Clear face crops are encrypted individually, each to the cryptographic key of the person they belong to.
- The base becomes the portable image layer of the BBP container. Protected face regions are pixelated; faces kept visible or missed during review remain clear.
- Clear face entities, biometric fingerprints, captions, and comments are encrypted on your device. The server receives the redacted base plus those encrypted entities.
What happens with face recognition
Section titled “What happens with face recognition”BrightBlur uses on-device face recognition to suggest who is in a photo. It computes a numerical fingerprint for each detected face, then compares it against stored fingerprints of known people.
- Fingerprints are computed on your device using a neural network that runs in your browser. Nothing is sent to the server for comparison.
- Before a fingerprint leaves your device, it is encrypted to the person’s cryptographic key.
- The server stores only encrypted fingerprints. It cannot decrypt them.
- When you upload a new photo, your device downloads the encrypted fingerprints, decrypts them locally, and compares them against the new faces.
Face recognition is not perfect. It may suggest the wrong person. All suggestions require your confirmation before publishing. You can undo any automatic tag.
What the server can and cannot see
Section titled “What the server can and cannot see”The server stores but cannot read:
- Face crops (encrypted per person)
- Face fingerprints (encrypted per person)
- Captions and comments (encrypted)
- Group private keys (encrypted per user)
The server can read:
- Your email address, hashed password, and BrightBlur identifier
- The permanently mosaicked base image: protected face regions are redacted, but bodies, clothing, surroundings, faces kept visible and any faces missed during review remain visible
- Group names and membership lists — the audiences and circles a photo is shared with
- Which photos are shared with which people
- Photo timestamps (captions themselves are encrypted)
- How many faces were detected in each photo — the count, though not the faces themselves
- The co-occurrence graph — which person-group ACLs are linked to which photos, and therefore which people appear together and how often. Bounding-box geometry is sealed inside each encrypted face entity rather than stored in the file’s visible metadata.
- Access request statuses and notification metadata
- How many face fingerprints exist per person (but not their content)
The server can read the redacted scene and the relationships recorded in sharing metadata. It cannot decrypt protected face crops, captions, comments or biometric fingerprints. If you report a photo, your device shares a viewable copy with moderators for review.
Encryption
Section titled “Encryption”BrightBlur combines secrets from X25519 and ML-KEM-768 to derive content-encryption keys. This design aims to retain confidentiality if one key-exchange algorithm is broken, assuming the other algorithm, the combiner and their implementations remain secure. It does not prevent a compromised device, dependency or delivered web client from exposing plaintext or keys.
For older phrase-based accounts, regenerating keys from the 12-word phrase uses Argon2id, a memory-hard key-derivation function. New passkey accounts use a random seed instead. The database itself is encrypted at rest by Cloudflare D1.
Children’s data
Section titled “Children’s data”BrightBlur processes photographs of children. Children are data subjects, not users. They do not create accounts, they do not interact with the app, and no data is collected from them directly.
- Detected faces are protected by default. The uploader must check for missed faces and incorrect tags before sharing. A controller, typically a parent or authorised administrator, manages access to each child’s protected face data.
- Privacy settings default to maximum restriction.
- There is no profiling, no algorithmic recommendation, no behavioural tracking, and no advertising.
- BrightBlur complies with the ICO’s Age Appropriate Design Code (Children’s Code).
Face detection is not perfect
Section titled “Face detection is not perfect”No face detection system is 100% accurate. Faces may be missed if they are partially hidden, at an extreme angle, very small in the frame, or obscured by face paint, costumes, or unusual lighting. If a face is not detected, it will not be pixelated.
BrightBlur addresses this through several layers:
- The uploader reviews all detected faces before publishing and can manually draw regions around missed faces.
- Zero-face photos prompt a warning asking the uploader to confirm there are genuinely no faces.
- Any viewer can report a missed face for re-processing.
We are honest about this limitation because we believe transparency is more trustworthy than false promises of perfection.
Data sharing
Section titled “Data sharing”BrightBlur does not share your data with third parties. There are no analytics services, no advertising networks, no data brokers. The app contains no third-party tracking code.
Photos are shared only with the people you choose. Face data is accessible only to people you have granted access to that person. These boundaries are enforced cryptographically, not just by access control rules.
Deletion
Section titled “Deletion”Deleting a person: A controller can delete a person, which permanently removes all face data, fingerprints, cryptographic keys, and access records in a single operation. The pixelated base images remain because they contain no recoverable face data.
Deleting a photo: The uploader can delete any photo they uploaded. This removes the base image, all face slices, and all associated data.
Deleting your account: Removes the photos you uploaded and their associated data, your comments, your pending access requests, your person record, your group memberships, your sessions, and your encryption keys. Face fingerprints you contributed to other people’s profiles are anonymised — the link to you is removed — rather than deleted, so other people’s recognition of their own profiles is unaffected. Abuse reports you have filed and security access logs are retained where we have a legal or safety basis to keep them.
What deletion cannot do: If another user has already viewed and cached a decrypted photo on their device, BrightBlur cannot force that cached data to be deleted. This is an inherent limitation of end-to-end encryption. Once data has been decrypted and displayed, the recipient holds a copy.
Cookies and local storage
Section titled “Cookies and local storage”- Authentication cookie: Keeps you logged in. Expires after 15 minutes, at which point it is silently renewed. Contains only your BrightBlur identifier. Not accessible to JavaScript (httpOnly).
- Refresh token cookie: Renews your authentication cookie. Expires after 30 days of inactivity. Not accessible to JavaScript (httpOnly).
- Local storage (IndexedDB): Caches your passkey’s unlock key and your wrapped (still-encrypted) seed so you stay unlocked across page loads. The unwrapped seed itself is kept only in memory, never written to storage. Cleared on logout.
There are no third-party cookies, no analytics cookies, and no tracking of any kind.
Your rights under UK GDPR
Section titled “Your rights under UK GDPR”- Access: You can view all data associated with your account through the app.
- Erasure: Use the deletion features described above. For requests that cannot be handled through the app, contact us.
- Withdraw consent: Leave any group at any time. Delete your person record to withdraw consent for biometric processing.
- Portability: Planned for a future release.
- Complaint: You may lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) at ico.org.uk.
Infrastructure
Section titled “Infrastructure”BrightBlur runs on Cloudflare Workers. The database is Cloudflare D1 (built on SQLite), and image containers and encrypted report images use Cloudflare R2. Both provide infrastructure encryption at rest. A breach could expose the plaintext-redacted BBP base and the social graph metadata described above, plus encrypted face entities and other ciphertext that remain unreadable without users’ keys.
Contact
Section titled “Contact”For privacy questions or data deletion requests that cannot be handled through the app:
Email: privacy@brightblur.app
Changes to this policy
Section titled “Changes to this policy”We will notify users of material changes via in-app notification. The “last updated” date at the top of this page reflects the most recent revision.